With Russia right across the border. Finland’s security policy. OSW Studies 73 May 2018

Finland sees Russia as a source of opportunities and threats. On the one hand, Russia is an important trade partner and Finland believes that intensive political contacts with Russia provide a boost for its international profile as a non-aligned broker between the West and Russia. On the other hand, Finland is concerned by the Russian vision of the international order based on great powers’ spheres of influence, and by Russia’s increasing military capabilities. This is why Finland’s strategy towards Russia is a combination of economic and political co-operation, aimed at reducing the risk of bilateral tensions, and military deterrence. Finland is a country situated on the periphery of its civilisational base (the West) and whose border with Russia is over 1,300 km long. Thus, its armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. Finland maintains general conscription and a large trained reserve force, which raises the costs of possible aggression. Finland has also intensified its defence co-operation with Sweden, the USA, NATO and within the EU in response to Russia’s military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations

The northern tandem. The Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation. OSW Commentary NUMBER 298 | 20.03.2019

In response to the change in the security environment after 2014, militarily non-aligned Sweden and Finland are developing their defence cooperation with NATO and the USA and strengthening their bilateral defence relationship. Although a bilateral alliance is unlikely, the two states are suggesting that, were a situation of a conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region to occur, the hypothetical aggressor will need to take into account their cooperation and joint actions with NATO. The Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out in March 2019, whose scenario includes the defence of northern Sweden, are a display of the interoperability of the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. However, the military synergy between Sweden and Finland is limited by the differences in their respective models of armed forces, years-long insufficient defence expenditure, and military personnel cuts

New ideas for total defence: Comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia. OSW Report 2020-03-31.

In recent years, the Nordic and Baltic region has witnessed a growing interest in the concept of comprehensive security, which hails from the Cold War doctrine of total defence. This originates from the regional pivot to territorial defence and countering hybrid threats. A comprehensive approach to security is considered a driver for enhancing national resilience and for ensuring the best possible operational environment for armed defence. It incorporates military and non-military aspects of national security, and crisis management. Finland and Estonia stand out with respect to a comprehensive security strategy. Among the Nordic countries, Finland has the longest continuous tradition of a comprehensive approach to security, rooted in its strategic culture and societal background, while Estonia was the first of the Baltic states to begin building a comprehensive security system (already in 2008). The aim of this report is to present the concepts for comprehensive security in the Nordic and Baltic states, focusing on Finland and Estonia as case studies, and to analyse the practical ways in which comprehensive security is achieved in the two countries

The multi-speed Baltic States. Reinforcing the defence capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. OSW STUDIES 68 August 2017

The Baltic states are often viewed by the West and Russia as a single region. However, the different economic and demographic potentials, strategic cultures and geographic location result in differences in their defence solutions. Estonia is devoted to a conscript-based army with a significant reserve force, Latvia is developing professional army with a small reserve, and Lithuania has decided to combine the two models

Overstretched? Denmark’s security policy and armed forces in light of the new Defence Agreement. OSW Commentary NUMBER 266 | 20.04.2018

In the period from the 1990s until the end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2014, the primary aim of Denmark’s security policy was to contribute to NATO and US-led crisis management operations. Denmark developed an expeditionary model of its armed forces capable of meeting the demands of asymmetric warfare while cutting its defence budget and the number of military personnel. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Denmark did not increase its defence spending and did not make any changes to its armed forces development strategy. Meanwhile, it started paying more attention to deterrence in the Baltic region, adapting to NATO’s new priorities with regard to the reinforcement of collective defence. This led to an increase in Denmark’s military presence in the Baltic states. From Copenhagen’s point of view, this area could become a theatre for Russia to test NATO’s credibility and unity. However, Denmark sees armed conflict between Russia and NATO as highly unlikely, and considers terrorism to be the main threat to its security. The need to strike a balance between the ‘expeditionary DNA’ of the Danish armed forces and their new tasks on NATO’s eastern flank has triggered a discussion on the country’s shortage of military equipment and personnel, as well as its inadequate defence spending

The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s security policy and NATO’s eastern flank. OSW Commentary NUMBER 299 | 03.04.2019

Regardless of how the UK leaves the European Union and what final timetable it adopts, Brexit has influenced the British debate on security policy, and may have implications for Britain’s involvement in NATO’s defence and deterrence strategy towards Russia. The United Kingdom plays an important role on NATO’s north-eastern flank. London has deployed British troops to the NATO battlegroups in Estonia and Poland, and it is expanding its military cooperation with Norway in securing the maritime areas of the North Atlantic. The UK has also bolstered its military presence in Romania. After leaving the European Union, London will still be involved in the security of Northern and Central & Eastern Europe. However in the future, Britain’s strong military footprint on NATO’s eastern flank may be challenged by the increased activity of British armed forces beyond Europe as part of the ‘Global Britain’ concept, or by a change in the priorities of Britain’s security policy by the Labour Party, which wants to focus to a greater degree on global threats and the UN’s peacekeeping operations

Seeking an additional reassurance. The EU and France in Estonia’s security policy. OSW COMMENTARY 2020-09-23.

Over the last few years, Tallinn has been increasingly involved in military cooperation in the EU and with France. To date, Estonia is the only country on NATO’s eastern flank to join the French-led European Intervention Initiative. The country is developing the European pillar of its security policy with a view to diversifying military cooperation, which has centred primarily around the US and UK. This is due to Estonia’s concerns about the future of their military posture in Europe. However, due to the leading role of the US and UK in NATO’s deterrence and defence on the eastern flank, working with the two countries will continue to be Estonia’s security policy priority. Apart from involvement in a number of PESCO projects, Estonia is focused on expanding its participation in the EU defence industrial cooperation. In June 2020, five Estonian-based entities received over EUR 10 million from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme, making this small country the main Central and Eastern Europe recipient of the programme funds. Estonia is also increasing its contribution to French military operations. In July 2020, roughly fifty Estonian special forces troops were sent to Mali to reinforce the French operation Takuba in the Sahel